\n<\/p>\n
A controversial child sexual abuse material (CSAM)-scanning proposal that\u2019s under discussion by lawmakers in Europe is both the wrong response to tackling a sensitive and multifacted societal problem and a direct threat to democratic values in a free and open society, a seminar organized by the European Data Protection Supervisor heard yesterday.<\/p>\n
More than 20 speakers at the three hour event voiced opposition to a European Union legislative proposal that would require messaging services to scan the contents of users\u2019 communications for known and unknown CSAM, and to try to detect grooming taking place in real-time \u2014 putting the comms of all users of apps subject to detection orders under an automatic and non-targeted surveillance dragnet.<\/p>\n
Critics argue the approach runs counter to the fundamental freedoms that are pivotal to democratic societies. The European Commission has pushed back aggressively against this sort of criticism to date \u2014 arguing the proposal is a proportionate and targeted response to a growing problem. It was even spotted recently using microtargeted ads to promote the plan<\/a>, apparently turning to covert targeting to attack critics<\/a> by suggesting they do not support child protection (despite the existence of another live EU legislative proposal that seeks to restrict the use of political microtargeting<\/a>\u2026 so, er, oops!).<\/p>\n The contentious debate is still live as it\u2019s now up to EU co-legislators, in the European Parliament and Member States, via the Council, to hash out (no pun intended!) a way forward \u2014 which means there\u2019s still time for regional lawmakers to pull back.<\/p>\n And the need for the bloc to pull back from this brink was absolutely the message from yesterday\u2019s event.<\/p>\n The European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) himself, Wojciech Wiewi\u00f3rowski, suggested the EU could be at a point of no return if lawmakers go ahead and pass a law that mandates the systemic, mass surveillance of private messaging. In his opening remarks, he suggested the Commission\u2019s proposal could bring consequences that go \u201cwell beyond what concerns with the protection of children\u201d.<\/p>\n \u201cIt is often being used in the debate that this proposal is only about protecting children. I would like this to be the case \u2014 but it\u2019s not,\u201d he went on, arguing that the Commission\u2019s proposal questions the \u201cfoundations\u201d of what privacy means in a democratic society; and pointing out that privacy, once undermined, leads to \u201cthe radical shift from which there might be no return\u201d, as he put it.<\/p>\n Without amendments, the proposal would \u201cfundamentally change the Internet and the digital communication as we know it\u201d, Wiewi\u00f3rowski also warned at the event\u2019s close \u2014 invoking his personal childhood experience of living under surveillance and restrictions on freedom of expression imposed by the Communist regime in Poland. And, most certainly, it\u2019s an awkward comparison for the EU\u2019s executive to be asked to contemplate coming from the mouth of one of its own expert advisors.<\/p>\n The EDPS, an EU institution which advises the Commission on data protection and privacy, is not a newly converted critic of the Commission proposal either. Indeed, the Supervisor and the European Data Protection Board put out a joint opinion<\/a> a full year ago that warned the legislative plan raises \u201cserious data protection and privacy concerns\u201d \u2014 including for encryption. But that joint expression of concern from inside the EU has \u2014 so far \u2014 failed to persuade Johansson or the Commission to rethink their full-throated backing for mass surveillance of citizens\u2019 private communications.<\/p>\n Seminar attendees heard that Johansson had been invited to attend but the event but had declined to do so. Nor did anyone else from the Commission agree to attend. (We\u2019ve reached out to the Commission and Johansson\u2019s office about her decision not to participate and will update our report if we get a response).<\/p>\n The Commission presented its draft CSAM legislation back in May 2022<\/a>. Since then opposition has been building over human rights impacts as the implications of the proposal have become clearer. While concerns \u2014 and even suspicions \u2014 about the driving forces behind the proposal have mounted, not helped by a perceived lack of engagement from the Commission with civil society organizations and others expressing genuinely held misgivings. The emotive debate has also, at times, lent itself to unhelpful polarization.<\/p>\n Even from the start there were clear questions about the legality<\/a> of the proposal. EU law requires any interferences with fundamental rights like privacy and freedom of expression to be necessary and proportionate. While the imposition of a general content monitoring obligation on online platforms is prohibited \u2014 so how does that square with a law that could put the messages of hundreds of millions of Europeans under watch by design?<\/p>\n Giving a perspective on the legality at yesterday\u2019s seminar, Frederik Borgesius, professor at iHub, Radboud University, in the Netherlands, said in his view the Commission\u2019s proposal is not a proportionate way of interfering with fundamental rights. He referred back to case law on data retention for terrorism \u2014 as the most relevant comparison \u2014 which has seen the bloc\u2019s top court repeatedly strike down general and indiscriminate storage<\/a> of Europeans\u2019 metadata. (Not that that\u2019s stopped Member States from keeping on breaking the law, though\u2026 )<\/p>\n \u201cActually, the court might not even get to a proportionality test because the data retention cases were about metadata. And this is about analysing the content<\/em> of communications,\u201d he went on. \u201cThe EU Charter of Fundamental Rights has an element that says if the essence of a fundamental right is violated then the measure is illegal by definition \u2014 there\u2019s not even a need for a proportionality test.\u201d<\/p>\n Borgesius also pointed out there\u2019s case law on this essence point too. \u201cWhen is the essence violated? Well, the court has said \u2014 in a different case \u2014 if authorities can access the contents of communications on such a large scale then the discussion is over,\u201d he explained. \u201cNo room for proportionality test \u2014 the essence of the right to privacy would be violated, and therefore such a measure would be illegal.\u201d<\/p>\n Legality is just one element the seminar considered. Multiple critics of the Commission\u2019s proposal speaking at the event also argued it\u2019s even ill-fitted in its main claimed purpose \u2014 of addressing the complex societal problem of child sexual abuse \u2014 and actually risks causing unintended consequences, including for children.<\/p>\n The seminar heard repeated concerns from panellists that minors could end up being harmed because of the regulation\u2019s single-minded focus on scanning private comms, with speakers emphasizing the importance of evidence-based policymaking in such a sensitive area, rather than a blinding rushing down the road of technosolutionism.<\/p>\n One issue several speakers raised is that a large proportion of the sexualized content involving minors that\u2019s being shared online is actually being done so by (and between) consenting minors (i.e. sexting). The Commission proposal could therefore lead to children being investigated and even criminalizing for exploring their own sexual identities, they suggested \u2014 since understanding what is and isn\u2019t CSAM is not something that can necessarily be done by simply reviewing the imagery itself.<\/p>\n The Commission\u2019s proposal hinges on the idea of forcing messaging platforms which are suspected of hosting CSAM to scan for illegal content (and grooming activity) and pass flagged content to a European Center to carry out initial checks \u2014 but also potentially send reported content on to law enforcement agencies.<\/p>\n Certainly in the case of new CSAM (i.e suspected CSAM content that has not been previously seen, investigated and confirmed as illegal child sexual abuse material), context is essential to any assessment of what is being depicted. This is not something an AI scanning tool, or even a trained human looped in to review flagged imagery, can inherently know just by looking at a piece of content, the seminar heard.<\/p>\n So a law that automates CSAM scanning and reporting without there being a foolproof way to distinguish between actual CSAM, innocent sexting between kids, or even just a parent sending a family holiday snap to a relative via a private messaging channel they believe to be a safe way to share personal stories, looks the opposite of an intelligent response to child sexual abuse.<\/p>\n \u201cA big part of the material that we see is not a result of sexual abuse,\u201d Arda Gerkens, chair of the board of The Netherlands\u2019 Authority for the Prevention of Online Terrorist Content and Child Sexual Abuse Material, told the seminar. \u201cThe material\u2019s indeed being spread by the Internet \u2014 but it\u2019s a growing number which is a result of sexual activity of young people themselves.\u201d<\/p>\n The risk of \u201cleaked images and sextortion\u201d are \u201ceven more reason why we should keep the Internet safe and secure\u201d, she also suggested \u2014 pointing out children can be put in an exceptionally vulnerable position if their accounts are hacked and their private comms fall into the hands of someone who wants to manipulate and abuse them.<\/p>\n \u201cThe scanning of private communication will certainly flag problematic situations \u2014 I definitely know that that\u2019s already happening \u2014 but it\u2019s not the solution to combat this sexual child abuse,\u201d she went on, speaking up in favor of a narrower practice of scanning for known<\/em> CSAM on image hosting websites to stop the further spread of material \u2014 \u201cbut not to prosecute\u201d.<\/p>\n The legislation proposed by the Commission doesn\u2019t properly address image hosting websites as potential repositories of CSAM, she suggested, because it\u2019s too focused on \u201cprivate communication and subsequently prosecution\u201d. She therefore predicted the EU\u2019s approach will be \u201ccounterproductive\u201d when it comes to detecting perpetrators and ending domestic sexual violence.<\/p>\n \u201cThe sheer amount of images will overflow the systems we have and put even more pressure on the fragile law enforcement systems,\u201d she suggested, adding: \u201cIt would be much better to invest in those systems and strengthen collaborations between the EU countries.\u201d<\/p>\n Another speaker, Susan Landau, bridge professor in cyber security and Policy at Tufts University, also argued the Commission\u2019s proposal misunderstands a multifaceted and highly sensitive issue \u2014 failing to respond to different (and distinct) types of child sexual abuse and exploitation that can occur over the Internet.<\/p>\n An approach that\u2019s centered on investigation and prosecution, as the Commission\u2019s is, would hit a wall in many cases, she also predicted \u2014 pointing out, for example, that an overwhelming majority of Internet-enabled sex trafficking cases involve victims being abused by people close to them, who they do not want to report.<\/p>\n \u201cWhat you need there, as well as with real time abuse, is spaces that make children safe. Community spaces. Online safety education. Education about online security and safety by design,\u201d she suggested.<\/p>\n \u201cThe point is that the law requires scanning to handle the child sexual abuse and exploitation issue misunderstands the issue,\u201d Landau added. \u201cThere are multiple ways\u2026 to prevent and investigate the crime [of child sexual abuse] that are not affected by end-to-end encryption (E2EE) . Meanwhile, end-to-end encryption is a technology that secures both children and adults.\u201d<\/p>\n Also speaking during the event was Alexander Hanff, a privacy expert and advocate \u2014 who is himself a survivor of child sexual abuse<\/a>. He too asserted that a lot of sexualized imagery of children that\u2019s shared online is being done privately between consenting minors. But the impact the Commission\u2019s proposal would have on minors who sext is not something the EU\u2019s executive appears to have considered.<\/p>\n \u201cIf we now introduce a law which requires the scanning of all digital communications, and by that we\u2019re talking billions, tens of billions of communications every single day across the EU, those images would then be sent to multiple individuals along the chain of investigation \u2014\u00a0 including Europol and various law enforcement bodies, etc \u2014 creating victims,\u201d he warned. \u201cBecause one of the things that we see in relation to CSAM, and speaking as a survivor myself, is the impact on the dignity of the individuals for whom it relates.<\/p>\n \u201cThe very fact that people are viewing these images \u2014 which is exactly the intent of the Commission to try and overcome \u2014 is a form of abuse itself. So if we now take innocent pictures, which have been shared among consenting individuals, and expose them to potentially hundreds of other individuals down the investigation chain then we are indeed actually creating more victims as a result of this.\u201d<\/p>\n Another attendee \u2014 WhatsApp\u2019s public policy director, Helen Charles \u2014 chipped into the discussion to offer an industry view, saying that while the Meta-owned messaging platform supports EU lawmakers in their aim of tackling child sexual abuse, it shares concerns that the Commission\u2019s approach is not well targeted at this multifaceted problem; and that it risks major unintended consequences for web users of all ages.<\/p>\n \u201cWe think that any outcome that requires scanning of content in end-to-end encrypted messaging would undermine fundamental rights, as several colleagues have set out,\u201d she told the seminar. \u201cInstead, the draft regulation should set the right conditions for services like WhatsApp and other end-to-end encrypted services to mitigate the misuse of our services in a way that\u2019s reasonable and proportionate but that also considers both the different nature of harm\u2026\u00a0but also includes things like prevention and other upstream measures that could help tackle these kinds of harms.\u201d<\/p>\n Charles went on to advocate for EU lawmakers to give platforms more leeway to use \u201ctraffic data\u201d (i.e. metadata; not comms content) for the prevention of child sexual abuse under the EU\u2019s existing ePrivacy Directive \u2014 noting that the current (temporary) ePrivacy derogation for platforms, which lets them scan non-E2EE messages for CSAM, only covers detection, reporting and takedown, not prevention.<\/p>\n \u201cHaving access to some data can be helpful in a targeted proportionate way to address those risks,\u201d she argued. \u201cWhere it is legal Meta does deploy techniques, including the use of traffic data, to identify potentially problematic behaviour. This is not just about detection, though. This is also about prevention\u2026 [T]raffic data can be an important signal when used with other signals to help services proactively disrupt violating message groups and accounts who may be seeking to abuse our services.<\/p>\n \u201cSo we would encourage institutions, when they\u2019re thinking about the way forward here, to both ensure end-to-end encryption is protected and that services can tackle CSAM without accessing message content but also look at ways that EPG traffic data can be processed in a proportionate and targeted manner, including for prevention. We think, in this way, the regulation will move closer to achieving its objectives.\u201d<\/p>\n The seminar also heard concerns about the limitations of the current state of the art in AI-based CSAM detection. A big issue here is AI tools used to detect known CSAM are proprietary \u2014 with no independent verification of claims made for their accuracy, said Jaap-Henk Hoepman, visiting professor in computer science at Karlstad University. \u201cThe problem is that the [CSAM detection] techniques being discussed \u2014 either PhotoDNA [developed by Microsoft] or NeuralHash [made by Apple] \u2014 are proprietary and therefore not publicly available and known and study-able algorithms \u2014 which means that we simply have to rely on the figures provided by the companies on how effective these technologies are.\u201d<\/p>\n He also pointed to work by academics and other researchers who have reverse engineered PhotoDNA that he said revealed some elementary flaws \u2014 such as evidence it\u2019s particularly easy to evade detection against a known CSAM fingerprint by simply rotating or mirroring the image.<\/p>\n \u201cClearly this has implications for the proportionality of the [Commission] proposal, because a serious breach of privacy is being proposed for an not-so-effective measure,\u201d he added, going on to warn about risks from \u201ctargeted false positives\u201d \u2014 where attackers seek to manipulate an image so that an algorithm detects it as CSAM when, to the human eye, it looks innocuous \u2014 either to frame an innocent person or trick app users into forwarding a doctored image (and, if enough people share it, he warned it could flood detection systems and even cause a DDoS-like event).<\/p>\n \u201cThis technology is not free from error \u2014 and we\u2019re talking many billions of communications [being scanned] every day. So even if we have a 0.1% error rate that accounts for many millions of false positives or false negatives on a daily basis. Which is not something that we can subscribe to in a democracy,\u201d Hanff also warned, chiming in with a technosocial perspective on flawed AI tools.<\/p>\n Claudia Peersman, a senior research associate in the Cyber Security Research Group of the University of Bristol, had a pertinent assessment to offer related to work she\u2019d been involved with at the Rephrain Centre. The expert academic group recently independently assessed five proof-of-concept projects, developed in the UK with government backing, to scan E2EE content for CSAM without \u2014 per the Home Office\u2019s headline claim \u2014 compromising people\u2019s privacy.<\/p>\n The problem is, none of the projects lived up to that billing<\/a>. \u201cNone of these tools were able to meet [our assessment] criteria. I think this is the most important part of our conclusion. Which does not mean that we do not support the development of AI supported tools for online child protection in general. We just believe that the tools are not ready to be deployed on such a large scale on private messages within end-to-end encrypted environments,\u201d she told the seminar.<\/p>\n Delegates also heard a warning that client-side scanning \u2014 the technology experts suggest the EU law will force onto E2EE platforms such as WhatsApp if\/when they\u2019re served with a CSAM detection order \u2014 is far too new and immature to be rushed into mainstream application.<\/p>\n \u201cAs computer science researchers we\u2019ve just begun to look at this technology,\u201d said Matthew Green, a cryptographer professor at The Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore. \u201c<\/span>I want to stress how completely new the idea of client side scanning is \u2014 the very first computer science research papers on the topic appeared in 2021 and we\u2019re not even two years later, and we\u2019re already discussing laws that mandate it.\u201d<\/p>\n \u201cThe problem of building systems where [content scanning] algorithms are confidential and can\u2019t be exploited is something we\u2019re just beginning to research. And so far, many of our technical results are negative \u2014 negative in the sense that we keep finding ways to break these systems,\u201d he also told the seminar. \u201cBreak them means that we will ultimately violate the confidentiality of many users. We will cause false positives. We will cause bad data to be injected into the system.<\/p>\n \u201cAnd, in some cases, there\u2019s this possibility that abuse victims may be re traumatised if the systems are built poorly\u2026 I\u2019m just a computer scientist. I\u2019m not a legislator or a lawyer. My request to this community is please, please give us time. To actually do the research, to figure out whether and how to do this safely before we start to deploy these systems and mandate them by law.\u201d<\/p>\n A number of speakers also had passionate critiques that the views (and rights) of children themselves are being ignored by lawmakers \u2014 with several accusing the Commission of failing to consult kids about a proposal with severe implications for children\u2019s rights, as well as for the privacy and fundamental rights of everyone who uses digital comms tools.<\/p>\n \u201cWe should involve the children,\u201d said Gerkens. \u201cWe are speaking here about them. We are judging about what they do online. We have a moral opinion about it. But we\u2019re not talking to them. They are the ones we are speaking about. We haven\u2019t involved them in this legislation. I think we should.\u201d<\/p>\n Sabine Witting, assistant professor at Leiden University, also warned over a raft of \u201cnegative\u201d impacts on kids\u2019 rights \u2014 saying the EU proposal will affect children\u2019s right to privacy, personal data protection, freedom of expression and access to information.<\/p>\n \u201cIn this context, I really would like to highlight that \u2014 from a children\u2019s rights perspective \u2014 privacy and protection are not contradicting each other. Actually, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, and its General Comment number 25, made it very clear that privacy is actually vital for children\u2019s safety. So privacy is not a hindrance of children\u2019s safety as it\u2019s often projected. It\u2019s actually an important precondition to safety,\u201d she said.<\/p>\n Witting also had a strong message about the harms that could accrue for adolescents whose private texts to each other get sucked up and caught in a CSAM-scanning dragnet. \u201cThe investigation alone can already be very, very harmful for affected adolescents, especially in cases where we have adolescents from marginalised communities. For example, LGBTQ+ children,\u201d she warned. \u201cBecause this kind of investigation might lead to false disclosure, further marginalisation and in a worst case scenario, also political persecution or the like, so children and adolescents being targets of a criminal investigation is already harmful in and of themselves.<\/p>\n \u201cUnfortunately the proposal will not be able to prevent that from happening. So this whole process of scanning private communications among adolescents of the most intimate nature, the further review by private sector, by government, the potential involvement of law enforcement, all of that is really a significant violation of children\u2019s right to privacy.\u201d<\/p>\n Witting said she\u2019d raised this issue with the Commission \u2014 but had no response. \u201cI think because there is just no simple answer,\u201d she added. \u201cBecause it lies in the nature of the subject matter that these kinds of cases will not be able to be filtered out along the process.\u201d<\/p>\n The idea of the EU passing a law that sanctions warrantless searches of everyone\u2019s \u201cdigital worlds\u201d was skewered more generally by Iverna McGowan, director of the European office of the Center for Democracy and Technology.<\/p>\n \u201cWhat essentially the detection orders amount to are warrantless searches of our digital worlds,\u201d she argued. \u201cWe would of course never expect or accept that law enforcement would enter our homes, or private setting, with no warrants and no reasonable suspicion to search everything belonging to us. And so we cannot of course, allow that to happen on the online space either because it would be a death knell to the rule of law and criminal law as we know it in the digital context.\u201d<\/p>\n Going on to offer some thoughts on how to salvage something from the Commission proposal \u2014 i.e. to undo the existential threat is poses to European values and democracy \u2014 would, she suggested, require a fundamental rewriting of the detection order provisions.\u00a0Including to ensure provisions are formulated with \u201csufficient precision\u201d to not apply to people whose conduct is not suspected of being criminal.<\/p>\n She also argued for an independent judicial authority being invoked to sign off searches and verify the purposes and basis upon which individuals or groups of people are suspected. Plus proportionality tests built in \u2014 to determine whether the law allows for a truly independent assessment.<\/p>\n \u201cIf you consider that all of these different elements would have to be in line in order for detection order to be lawful then I think we\u2019re in a very challenging situation at the moment with the text that\u2019s on the table before us,\u201d she cautioned.<\/p>\n Mission creep was another concern raised by several speakers \u2014 with panellists pointing to documents obtained by journalists<\/a> that suggest Europol wants unfiltered access to data obtained under the CSAM-scanning proposal.<\/p>\n \u201c[We] know that the objective of Europol is to become a data hub and to also enlarge and strengthen its missions,\u201d said MEP Saskia Bricmont. \u201cIs there a risk of function creep? I think there is obviously, not only because of what has happened before in the evolution of the legislation around Europol but also because it seems that Europol has been pushing to obtain, in this legislation, what it aims for \u2014 namely, collect data, extend access to data and filter data \u2014 and which is also reflected in the Commission\u2019s proposal.\u201d<\/p>\n She noted this requires all reports \u201cnot manifestly unfounded\u201d to be sent simultaneously to Europol and national law enforcement agencies. \u201cSo far the European Parliament\u2019s position is not going in that direction\u2026 But, nevertheless, the initial proposal of the Commission is going in that direction and\u2026 Europol has been also pushing for extended detection to other crime areas<\/a> beyond CSAM.\u201d<\/p>\n The event was being held two days before Ylva Johansson, the bloc\u2019s commissioner for Home Affairs \u2014 who has been the driving force behind the CSAM-scanning proposal \u2014 is due to attend a hearing with the European Parliament\u2019s civil rights committee.<\/p>\n Critics have accused Johansson personally, and the Commission generally, of a lack of transparency and accountability around the controversial proposal. So the meeting will be closely watched and, most likely, rather a tense affair (to put it mildly).<\/p>\n One key criticism \u2014 also aired during the seminar \u2014 is that EU lawmakers are using the highly sensitive and emotive issue of child abuse to push a blanket surveillance plan on the region that would drastically impact the fundamental rights of hundreds of millions of Europeans.<\/p>\n \u201cWhat I find really problematic is the instrumentalization of such a sensitive topic, emotional question also related to the fight \u2014 and legitimate fight and prior fights \u2014 against child sexual abuse,\u201d said Bricmont. \u201cAnd this is also what we as MEPs as European parliament have to dig into, and we will have the exchanges with the commissioner in our LIBE Committee. Because we want to know more about this and other revelations of BalkanInsight\u2019s [investigative reporting]<\/a> when it comes to potential conflicts of interests.\u201d<\/p>\n \u201cLet us regret the absence of the Commission because I think we need dialogue,\u201d she added. \u201cI think we need to share knowledge and information in this file and that the fact that there\u2019s a closed door [increases] suspicion also. If we want to believe that the intentions are positive and to fight against child sexual abuse then it means that every party, every person needs to be also open to the counter arguments and bring founded arguments to explain why they want to go into that direction.<\/p>\n \u201cSo the question is, is the Commission misled? Misinformed? What is it? And this is also true for the Council side \u2014 because we know [there is there] probably also a lack of understanding of what is discussed today, and the risks related to the end of end-to-end encryption.\u201d<\/p>\n Earlier this month Johansson responded to critics by penning a blog post<\/a> that denounced what she suggested had included personal attacks on her and attacked those who have been raising doubts, including over opaque lobbying around the file \u2014 after journalists questioned<\/a> the level of access given to lobbyists for commercial entities involved in selling so-called safety tech who stand to benefit from a law that makes use of such tools mandatary.<\/p>\n She went so far as to suggest that civil society opposition to the CSAM-scanning proposal may be acting as a sock puppet for Big Tech interests.<\/p>\n \u201cThe biggest digital rights NGO in Europe gets funding from the biggest tech company in the world. EDRI, the European Digital Rights NGO, publishes on its website that it receives funding from Apple,\u201d she wrote. \u201cApple was accused of moving encryption keys to China, which critics say could endanger customer data. Yet no-one asks if these are strange bedfellows, no-one assumes Apple is drafting EDRI\u2019s speaking points.\u201d<\/p>\n Ella Jakubowska, senior policy advisor at EDRi, did not engage directly with the commissioner\u2019s attack on her employer during her own contribution to the seminar. Instead she dedicated her two-to-three minutes of speaking time to calling out the Commission for asking Europeans to make a false choice between privacy and safety.<\/p>\n \u201cThis disingenuous narrative has been reiterated in surveys which have crassly asked people if they agree that the ability to detect child abuse is more important than the right to online privacy,\u201d she said. \u201cThis is a misrepresentation of both privacy and safety \u2014 as if we can all altruistically give up some of our privacy in order to keep children safe online. It doesn\u2019t work in that way. And this sort of attitude really failed to grasp the deep social roots of the crime that we are talking about. To the contrary, I think it\u2019s clear that privacy and safety are mutually reinforcing.\u201d<\/p>\nMounting concerns<\/h2>\n
Children\u2019s rights being ignored?<\/h2>\n
No dialogue<\/h2>\n